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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-2320
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JERRY BLASSENGALE, JR., a/k/a BJ,
Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 2-07-cr-00371-002)
District Judge: Hon. Bruce W. Kauffman

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Friday, January 28, 2011
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge,
and STEARNS,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: February 8, 2011)
OPINION

McKEE, Chief Judge.
Jerry Blassengale appeals the district court‟s judgment of conviction. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm.

*

Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

I.
We write primarily for the parties and therefore will only set forth those facts that
are helpful to our brief discussion of the issues. Blassengale‟s sole issue on appeal is
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for assaulting a federal officer
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. He argues that his account of the arrest should be
credited and that Special Agent Pacchioli actually caused the collision.
The argument ignores the fact that we must review challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence, “in the light most favorable to the government, and [that we] will sustain the
verdict if „any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)). Under this
deferential standard, we must “presume that the jury properly evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, found the facts, and drew rational inferences.” United States v. Iafelice, 978
F.2d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1992).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), it is a federal crime when a person “forcibly assaults,
resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section
114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.”
There is an enhanced penalty under § 111(b), when a deadly or dangerous weapon is
used.
Blassengale contends that he was not aware that federal agents were pursuing him
when he fled the gas station and drove down Interstate 95. He testified that he was
unaware that Special Agent Pacchioli was even present until the collision at the end of
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the chase. However, a reasonable jury could have rejected his account for several
reasons. First, there was testimony to suggest that Blassengale was aware that FBI agents
were present at the gas station. The agents who approached his vehicle were wearing FBI
bulletproof vests, and one agent testified that he made eye contact with Blassengale in the
driver‟s side mirror. Second, Pacchioli had activated his patrol car lights and siren during
the entire car chase on Interstate 95. The jury cannot be faulted for concluding that this
would suggest that law enforcement agents were in pursuit. Finally, Detective
DiFrancesco, who was in the passenger seat of the car with Pacchioli, testified that he
motioned several times towards Blassengale to try to get him to stop. This evidence
would readily allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Blassengale was aware that he was
being pursued by law enforcement officers, and Blassengale‟s argument to the contrary is
frivolous. Moreover, we reject any suggestion that the government was required to prove
that he knew that the officers who were pursuing him were federal law enforcement
officers. “All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a federal
officer.” United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975). As the Court explained in
Feola, we can not construe the statute “as embodying an unexpressed requirement that an
assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer.” Id.
Blassengale further argues that he never actually collided with Special Agent
Pacchioli. He contends that he was already pulled over with the engine off when the
accident occurred. However, the jury obviously rejected Blassengale‟s efforts to suggest
that Pacchioli intentionally crashed into him in front of police and civilians. There is
nothing other than Blassengale‟s uncorroborated testimony to suggest that is what
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happened, and the jury clearly rejected his testimony. Pacchioli testified that Blassengale
was driving very quickly when he swerved into the patrol car. Thus, there was more
than sufficient evidence to establish Blassengale‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court‟s judgment of
conviction.
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